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Abstract
We consider a market comprising a number of perfectly complementary and homogeneous
commodities. We concentrate on the incentives for firms producing these commodities to merge
and form a vertical syndicate. The main result establishes that the nucleolus of the associated
market game corresponds to the unique vector of prices with the following properties: (i) they are
vertical syndication-proof, (ii) they are competitive, (iii) they yield the average of the buyers-
and the sellers-optimal allocations in bilateral markets, and (iv) they depend on the traders’
bargaining power but not on their identity. The proof uses an isomorphism between our class of
market games and the entire class of bankruptcy games.
Keywords: multilateral market, syndicate, cooperative game, assignment market, bankruptcy
problem, nucleolus
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1 Introduction
The economics of syndicates
A syndicate is a coalition of agents who agree to operate as a single entity. Standard approaches
in cooperative game theory do not always yield results in keeping with the idea that syndication
in markets is unequivocally profitable. Aumann (1973) considers an exchange economy (or market)
with an atomic trader plus a continuum of non-homogeneous traders. He provides examples in which
the former is worse off in any core allocation than in the unique competitive one. Thus, the atomic
trader would do better by dissolving herself into a continuum of competing traders. Postlewaite and
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Rosenthal (1974) look at a class of markets with two complementary commodities and a finite number
of agents, using the core as the set of predicted outcomes. They show in an example that by acting
as a syndicate, all agents owning the same commodity can never do better than when they are not
syndicated. Legros (1987) extends the analysis of Postlewaite and Rosenthal (1974) to this entire
class of markets, employing the nucleolus of the associated cooperative game (Schmeidler, 1969). He
shows that whether a syndicate of all agents owning one commodity is advantageous or not depends
on the size of its combined endowment relative to that of all agents owning the other commodity.
Alternative cooperative solution concepts such as the Shapley value (Gardner, 1977; Guesnerie, 1977;
Segal, 2003) also yield the result that syndication can be advantageous in some circumstances and
disadvantageous in others.1 Similar conclusions can be drawn from non-cooperative approaches to
the problem (Okuno et al., 1980; Salant et al., 1983; Bloch and Ghosal, 2000; Fershtman and Gandal,
1994),
Given this failure to obtain clear-cut results, is cooperative game theory an appropriate frame-
work in which to analyze syndication? Aumann (1973) concludes that the core fails in this sense.
Postlewaite and Rosenthal (1974), in contrast, argue that syndication might not have any compelling
advantages in certain economically meaningful settings. The fact that it is thus not rare for syndicates
to be disadvantageous to their members partially rehabilitates the core in their view. Some empirical
papers (see e.g. Asch and Seneca, 1976) find evidence that syndication is indeed sometimes associ-
ated with lower profitability for firms. The conjecture that antitrust activity always results in lower
prices—and higher consumer surplus—has also been disputed empirically (see e.g. Sproul, 1993). All
these findings, theoretical and empirical alike, reinforce the need for a greater understanding of the
role and potential advantages of syndicates, both positively and normatively. This is the general
object of our paper.
Multi-sided assignment markets
Bilateral assignment markets have come under close scrutiny since the seminal paper of Shapley
and Shubik (1972) (one should not forget Gale, 1960). In such markets any gains from trade arise
from transactions between a pair of agents, say, a seller and a buyer. In a multi-sided assignment
market (Quint, 1991), which includes the bilateral case, there are several types of agents and a positive
benefit can only be achieved by forming coalitions that consist of exactly one individual of each type.
An instance of a three-sided market is provided by Stuart Jr (1997). He considers an economy where
the outcome in one market may affect outcomes in another: a supplier, a firm, and a buyer—as a
final consumer—may be needed to carry out a transaction in this setting. Sherstyuk (1999) provides
related examples: a future home owner, an architect, and a worker are needed to build and sell a
house; a capitalist, an entrepreneur, and a worker are necessary to start a new firm.
It is well-known that when the market comprises at least three types of agents, the core of the
associated market game can be empty (Kaneko and Wooders, 1982). The potential lack of stability
of this broad family of markets does not mean they are uninteresting. In fact, there exist several
classes of multi-sided assignment markets that have a clear-cut economic interpretation and whose
1We refer to Schmalensee (2007) for the vast industrial organization literature that deals with the incentives for the
creation and/or destruction of syndicates.
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associated market games have a non-empty core. We shall give additional reasons based on real-world
observations why studying such markets is of interest.
IT firms occupy a prominent position in economies nowadays. These firms specialize in software
(Microsoft, Google, or Facebook), hardware (Samsung, LG, or Foxconn), or both (IBM, Cisco, or
Apple). A three-sided assignment market arises naturally when we consider consumers of technolog-
ical gadgets that combine hardware and software (an operating system), as these commodities are
perfect complements.2
When any buyer values each bundle of the component goods equally, the assignment market
is called a multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment market (Tejada and Núñez, 2012; Tejada, 2013).
Bilateral markets of this type have been extensively analyzed in the literature (von Böhm-Bawerk,
1930; Shapley and Shubik, 1972; Mendelson, 1982; Granot and Granot, 1992; Núñez and Rafels, 2005).
While some segments of IT markets feature differentiated products, others consist of products which
are indistinguishable to consumers—consider, e.g., laptops of a given size and processor manufactured
by Asus and Lenovo. IT three-sided assignment markets with homogeneous products indeed exist
and are even common.
Syndication in multi-sided assignment markets
Two salient types of syndication can be considered for arbitrary multi-sided assignment markets.
First, sellers owning the same commodity may collude, giving rise to a horizontal syndicate. This is
the type of syndication considered in most of the papers already mentioned. Second, agents owning
different commodities may merge and form a vertical syndicate. To date, theoretical understanding
of this type of syndication is still limited. The goal of this paper is to make further progress in this
direction.
To elaborate, we concentrate on vectors of prices at which the formation of vertical syndicates
does not favor any market participant. To be precise, we define a price to be vertical syndication-
proof if any buyer’s surplus is unaffected when either (a) sellers of different commodities collude into
vertical syndicates, or (b) single firms split into more sellers of different commodities. Thus, at a
vertical syndication-proof price, vertical syndicates leave the buyers neither worse nor better off. If
a vertical syndication-proof price is also competitive, there are no incentives for individual sellers to
split artificially or for sellers owning different commodities to collude and form a vertical syndicate.
Several widely known IT firms have faced antitrust regulations in recent years. Microsoft has been
sued several times for abusing its market power in the operating system industry.3 Google is currently
being investigated by the EU for manipulating web search results to favor its own shopping service.4
Both examples indicate that public authorities grow concerned when a firm reaches a dominant
position in a single market. This fact notwithstanding, antitrust indictments have also targeted
acquisitions affecting two vertically related markets. A notorious case is the purchase of Motorola
by Google, which involved a firm producing software and a firm producing hardware.5 That is,
2The assumption that technology markets have only three sectors is a defensible simplification, despite the fact that
intermediary firms also participate in them.
3Economides (2001) analyzes the case of “US against Microsoft”.
4See http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/27/us-eu-google-antitrust-idUSKBN0NF1YX20150427, retrieved
on 3-July-2015.
5See http://www.bbc.com/news/business-18164190, retrieved on 29-June-2015.
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syndicates between firms producing different commodities have been formed, and their formation or
dissolution is certainly a matter that concerns firms, consumers, and antitrust authorities.
The main result
Our main finding, viz. Theorem II, is a characterization of the nucleolus of multi-sided Böhm-
Bawerk assignment games using four properties.6 To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
provide an axiomatic analysis of such solution concept for a class of market games. More specifically,
we show that the nucleolus payoffs yield the unique vector of prices with the following properties:
(i) they are vertical syndication-proof, (ii) they are competitive, (iii) they yield the average of the
buyers- and the sellers-optimal allocations in bilateral markets, and (iv) they are anonymous with
respect to the traders’ bargaining power.
The requirement that the labels of market traders be irrelevant, in particular, has already been
considered in axiomatic analyses of markets—see e.g. Dubey et al. (1980). More generally, the
widely applied two-player Nash bargaining solution (Nash Jr, 1950) treats both agents anonymously
when both the set of feasible allocations and the disagreement point are symmetric. The anonymity
property that we impose in this paper states that the surplus obtained by each market participant
should depend only on her bargaining power and the overall market surplus.7
We offer two alternative interpretations of the concept of a trader’s bargaining power for the
class of markets considered here. First, it can be understood as a proxy for the value she adds
to the rest of the market (Brandenburger and Stuart, 2007). In our model, a trader’s bargaining
power sets an upper bound on her marginal contribution to the market game. Second, the process
of Schumpeterian creative destruction exhibits high frequency in the IT sector. This either renders
some goods quickly obsolete or drastically reduces the costs of producing them. Innovating firms can
appropriate temporarily the monopoly-type returns from investment through either lower costs or
higher prices. A firm’s bargaining power can then be seen as a measure of the innovation embodied
in its product relative to the competition. Similarly, a consumer’s bargaining power is a measure of
her willingness-to-pay for the bundle in question compared to that of other buyers.
Our analysis also establishes conditions under which vertical syndication-proofness is incompatible
with horizontal syndication-proofness. Since a majority of the horizontal syndicates analyzed by
antitrust agencies occur in vertically related industries (Milliou and Petrakis, 2007), the analysis of
this latter type of syndication is also relevant for the class of markets analyzed in this paper.
A link to bankruptcy
The proof of our characterization result uses a link that we have discovered between our class
of market games and bankruptcy games. Bankruptcy problems involve situations in which several
individuals have claims over an estate, but the estate is not sufficient to satisfy all claims. The
cooperative approach to this problem was first addressed by O’Neill (1982), and a large literature
has followed. Bankruptcy problems are useful in economic theory due to their simplicity and because
they embody situations other than bankruptcy, e.g. taxation, cost sharing, or surplus sharing.8 Our
6We do not claim that the nucleolus and the properties characterizing are the only reasonable possibilities.
7The impact of buyers’ bargaining power on their surplus was analyzed in Inderst and Wey (2007).
8See Thomson (2003, 2015) for an extensive survey of the subject.
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paper complements this literature in that we identify a subclass of market games that is isomorphic
to the entire class of bankruptcy games—see Theorem I. The insights provided by this isomorphism
enable us to translate rules, properties, and results from one setting to another. Special attention is
paid to how the Talmud Bankruptcy Rule (Aumann and Maschler, 1985) translates into our class of
markets. Our findings thus reinforce the relevance and applicability of the game-theoretical model of
the bankruptcy problem.
Organization of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the main definitions and illustrate
them by examples. In Section 3 we establish a link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment
games and bankruptcy games. In Section 4 we propose a procedure to define (payoff) rules in our
class of markets from rules in bankruptcy problems, and vice versa. In Section 5 we analyze different
properties that rules in both settings might satisfy. In Section 6 we build on the previous sections
to cast light on the relation between the two aforementioned groups of properties. This helps us
characterize the unique rule in our class of markets that yields a vertical syndication-proof vector of
competitive prices and which satisfies three additional properties. In Section 7 we analyze alternative
forms of syndication. Section 8 concludes. The proofs of all auxiliary results can be found in the
Appendix.
2 Notation and preliminaries
A cooperative game with transferable utility (in short, a game) is a pair (N, v), where N is a finite
set of players and v, the characteristic function, is a real-valued function on 2N = {S : S ⊆ N}, with
v(∅) = 0. We denote by G the set of all games. For every finite set N , (N, v0) stands for the null
game, where for every S ⊆ N , v0(S) = 0. The set of non-negative real numbers is denoted by R+,
and for every x ∈ R we use the notation (x)+ = max{0, x}. We denote by RN the |N |-dimensional
Euclidean space with elements x ∈ RN having components xi, i ∈ N . A vector x ∈ RN is called
an allocation or payoff vector. For S ⊆ N and x ∈ RN , let as usual x(S) = ∑i∈S xi. We say that
x ∈ RN is an imputation of (N, v) if x(N) = v(N) and xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N . We let I(N, v)
denote the set of imputations of (N, v). The core of a game is the set of efficient allocations that
cannot be improved upon by any coalition on its own, i.e.,
C(N, v) =
{
x ∈ RN : x(N) = v(N) and for every S ( N, x(S) ≥ v(S)} .
Lastly, for x ∈ I(N, v) and S ∈ 2N \ {∅, N}, the excess of coalition S at x is defined by ev(S, x) =
v(S)− x(S), and it is a measure of the satisfaction of coalition S with respect to allocation x. Given
(N, v) ∈ G with I(N, v) 6= ∅ and x ∈ I(N, v), we define λ(x) ∈ R2N\{∅,N} as the vector of excesses
of all proper coalitions of N arranged in a non-increasing order. That is, λk(x) = ev(Sk, x) for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , 2n − 2} and λk(x) ≥ λj(x) if 1 ≤ k < j ≤ 2n − 2, where {S1, . . . , S2n−2} is the set of all
proper coalitions of N . The nucleolus of (N, v) is the imputation η(N, v) that minimizes λ(x) with
respect to the lexicographic order over the set of imputations. That is, λ(η(v)) ≤Lex λ(x) for all
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x ∈ I(N, v).9 It is well known that the nucleolus is always a single point and whenever the core of
the game is non-empty, it is a core allocation.
2.1 Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets and games
In this section, we introduce a particular class of multilateral assignment markets and we associate a
game with each of these markets.
Definition 2.1. Given an integer m > 1, an m-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment market (in short, a
market) is a tuple (N1, . . . , Nm, c, w), where N1, . . . , Nm−1 are the finite sets of sellers, Nm is the
finite set of buyers, c = (c1, . . . , cm−1) ∈ RN1+ × · · · × RN
m−1
+ , and w ∈ RN
m
+ .
The m sets of agents N1, . . . , Nm are called sectors. Unless stated to the contrary, henceforth
we let M = {1, . . . ,m} denote the set of sectors. Each seller owns exactly one unit of an indivisible
commodity. Each buyer is willing to buy a bundle composed of exactly one unit of each commodity.
The goods owned by two sellers belong to the same commodity if and only if both sellers belong
to the same sector. Hence in an m-sided market there are m − 1 different commodities. For each
k ∈ M \ {m}, cki stands for the valuation of seller i ∈ Nk of her own good (or simply the cost). To
buyer i ∈ Nm, wi stands for her valuation of a lot consisting of one good of each of the commodities.
Without loss of generality, we assume that |N1| = · · · = |Nm| = n by introducing dummy sellers
with very large reservation prices and dummy buyers with zero willingness-to-pay. We arrange sellers’
valuations in a non-decreasing order, and buyers’ valuations in a non-increasing order. That is, for
every k ∈ M \ {m}, ck1 ≤ · · · ≤ ckn and w1 ≥ · · · ≥ wn.10 Let BBM stand for the set of all such
markets. When no confusion regarding the set of agents can arise, we will denote a market simply
by (c, w).
Next, we present an example that will be used throughout the paper to illustrate certain defini-
tions.
Example 2.1. Consider the 24-person three-sided market given by
(c1, c2, w) = (30, 33, 40, 48, 50, 55, 70, 78;
25, 35, 58, 59, 60, 67, 70, 82;
200, 180, 160, 140, 130, 120, 100, 90).
We abuse language and henceforth use tuple indistinctly to refer both to the m-tuple consisting
of one agent of each type Z ∈ ∏mk=1Nk as well as to the coalition composed of all agents in the
m-tuple. A matching among N1, . . . , Nm is a set of n pairwise disjoint tuples. We denote by
M(N1, . . . , Nm) the set of all matchings among N1, . . . , Nm. Given (c, w) ∈ BBM, the mapping
a(c, w) :
∏m
k=1N
k → R+ describes the potential benefit obtained by every tuple. That is, for
Z = (i1, . . . , im) ∈
∏m
k=1N
k,
a(c, w)(Z) =
wim − ∑
k∈M\{m}
ckik

+
.
9Given x, y ∈ Rn, we say x <Lex y if there is some 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that xi < yi and xj = yj for 1 ≤ j < i. Also, we
say x ≤Lex y if x <Lex y or x = y.
10This assumption enables us to speak properly about the ith agent of sector k ∈M .
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When no confusion can arise, we will denote a(c, w)(Z) simply by aZ .
If money exists in the market and side payments between agents are allowed, a market (c, w)
generates an assignment game (N,ωc,w) ∈ G, where N = ∪mk=1Nk and for every S ⊆ N ,
ωc,w(S) = max
µ∈M(N1∩S,...,Nm∩S)
∑
Z∈µ
aZ
 ,
and the summation over the empty set is zero. That is, the assignment game describes the best
outcome that players in each coalition can achieve by organizing themselves in tuples. Hence, it is a
tool for the analysis of the division of the net profit ωc,w(N) between buyers and sellers. We denote
by BBG the set of all assignment games associated with markets in BBM.
Tejada (2013) studies the core of an arbitrary game in BBG by means of the so-called sectors
game, in which the (fictitious) players are the sectors of the market. Below we recall the main
result therein, but first we introduce some concepts to facilitate understanding. For every i ∈ N, let
Zi = (i, . . . , i) ∈ Rm. Then, for every (c, w) ∈ BBM let
r(c, w) = max
i∈{1,...,n}
{i : aZi > 0} , (1)
with the convention that r(c, w) = 0 if a(c, w) is the null mapping. When the market is clear from
the context, we will denote r(c, w) simply by r.
Example 2.1 (cont.). We can arrange the primitives of the market—note that r = 5, as indicated
by the boldface numbers—as follows:
Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 Surplus Truncated surplus
c1i c
2
j wk wk − c1i − c2j
(
wk − c1i − c2j
)
+
30 25 200 145 145
33 35 180 112 112
40 58 160 62 62
48 59 140 33 33
50 60 130 20 20
55 67 120 -2 0
70 70 100 -40 0
78 82 90 -70 0
For every S ⊆ M we introduce the notation ZS = r1S + (r + 1)1M\S ∈ Rm, where for every
T ⊆ M , 1T ∈ Rm is the vector such that 1T (k) = 1 if k ∈ T and 1T (k) = 0 if k /∈ T . Notice that
by introducing dummy players, we can always ensure that r + 1 < n, so there are at least r + 2
agents in all sectors. Also note that
{
ZS : S ⊆M} are precisely all the tuples that can be obtained
by combining the rth and r + 1th agents of each sector.
Definition 2.2. Given (c, w) ∈ BBM, the associated sectors game (M,vc,w) ∈ G is the game defined
for every S ⊆M by
vc,w(S) =
{
aZS if r > 0,
0 if r = 0.
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We denote by SG the set of all sectors games associated with markets in BBM.
Example 2.1 (cont.). The sectors game (M,vc,w) is given by M = {1, 2, 3} and
vc,w({1}) = 3, vc,w({1, 2}) = 10,
vc,w({2}) = 5, vc,w({1, 3}) = 13, vc,w({1, 2, 3}) = 20.
vc,w({3}) = 8, vc,w({2, 3}) = 15,
Payoffs in the sectors game belong to a different space than those of the corresponding market
game (RM versus RN1 × . . .×RNm). Since the main result in Tejada (2013) relates the core of both
games, we next introduce two tools that will allow us to map the payoffs of one space onto the payoffs
of another space.
First, for every (c, w) ∈ BBM we introduce the replica operator, Rc,w, which is an injective linear
function defined by
Rc,w : RM −→ RN1 × . . . × RNm
(x1, . . . , xm) −→ (
r︷ ︸︸ ︷
x1, . . . , x1,
n−r︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0; . . . ;
r︷ ︸︸ ︷
xm, . . . , xm,
n−r︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0).
Example 2.1 (cont.). The replica operator is given by
Rc,w(x1, x2, x3) = (x1, x1, x1, x1, x1, 0, 0, 0;x2, x2, x2, x2, x2, 0, 0, 0;x3, x3, x3, x3, x3, 0, 0, 0).
Second, for every (c, w) ∈ BBM we introduce the translation vector
tc,w =
(
t11, . . . , t
1
n; . . . ; tm1 , . . . , tmn
) ∈ RN1 × · · · × RNm ,
which is defined for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} by
tki =
{ (
ckr − cki
)
+ if k ∈M \ {m},
(wi − wr)+ if k = m,
if r(c, w) > 0 and by tc,w = (0, . . . , 0) if r(c, w) = 0.
Example 2.1 (cont.). The translation vector is given by
tc,w = (20, 17, 10, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0; 35, 25, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0; 70, 50, 30, 10, 0, 0, 0, 0).
Lastly, for every t ∈ Rl and B ⊆ Rl, let t + B denote the translated set B by the vector t, i.e.,
t + B = {t + x : x ∈ B}. We are now in a position to state both the main result in Tejada (2013)
and the main result in Tejada and Núñez (2012).
Theorem 2.1. (Tejada, 2013; Tejada and Núñez, 2012) For every market (c, w) ∈ BBM,
(i) C(N,ωc,w) = tc,w +Rc,w(C (M,vc,w)) 6= ∅,
(ii) η(N,ωc,w) = tc,w +Rc,w(η (M, vc,w)).
Part (i) indicates that the variability of the core of an assignment game can be entirely explained by
the core of the corresponding sectors game. Accordingly, the core of the assignment game associated
with the 24-person market in Example 2.1 is determined (up to a bijection) by the core of the 3-player
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sectors game also described in Example 2.1. The interests of all agents that belong to the same sector
are thus perfectly aligned in the core. Part (ii) states that the nucleolus of the assignment game can
also be obtained by translating the nucleolus of the sectors game.
The only information relevant for the variability of the core of a market is contained in the
positions r and (r + 1) of the vectors c1, . . . , cm−1, w. In particular, the agents in the (r + 1)th
position are important even though they do not contribute to creating any value. The reason is
that they determine the best outside option of the agents in the rth position. To every market
(N1, . . . , Nm, c, w) ∈ BBM, we then propose associating another market
(
N˜1, . . . , N˜m, c˜, w˜
)
where∣∣∣N˜1∣∣∣ = . . . = ∣∣∣N˜m∣∣∣ = 2 and
(c˜, w˜) =

((
c1r, c
1
r+1; . . . ; cm−1r , cm−1r+1
)
, (wr, wr+1)
)
if r(c, w) > 0,((
c11, c
1
2; . . . ; cm1 , cm2
)
, (w1, w2)
)
if r(c, w) = 0.
(2)
It is straightforward to check that (M,vc,w) =
(
M,vc˜,w˜
)
.
In the following definition, we formally introduce the class of all markets obtained from markets
in BBM by the above procedure. These markets will play an important role throughout the paper.
Definition 2.3. Given an integer m > 1, a 2-regular market is a market (N1, . . . , Nm, c, w) ∈ BBM
such that |N1| = · · · = |Nm| = 2 and
w2 −
∑
k∈M\{m}
ck2 ≤ 0.
We denote by 2 -BBM the set of all 2-regular markets and by 2 -BBG the set of assignment games
associated with 2-regular markets. Note that in a 2-regular market, the only possible transaction
takes place between the agents in the first position of each sector. Hence, we say that these agents
are active, while the agents in the second position are inactive. For every (c, w) ∈ 2 -BBM and
k ∈M , we define the bargaining power of the active agent of sector k when r(c, w) = 1 as
bk(c, w) =
{
ck2 − ck1 if k ∈M \ {m},
w1 − w2 if k = m.
(3)
The bargaining power of active agents when r(c, w) = 0 and of inactive agents is zero by definition.
We slightly abuse language and refer to bk(c, w) as the bargaining power of sector k.11
The following two remarks are straightforward:
Remark 2.1. For every 2-regular market, the marginal contribution of every agent to the grand
coalition in the market game is bounded from above by her bargaining power.12
Remark 2.2. The set of sector games associated with 2-regular markets is SG.
11For convenience, we define the bargaining power only in 2-regular markets. However, the definition can be gener-
alized to arbitrary markets in BBM by using Eq. (2) and the translation vector.
12Given a game (N, v) and a player i ∈ N , the marginal contribution of i to the grand coalition is the amount
v(N)− v(N \ {i}).
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2.2 Bankruptcy problems and games
In this section, we formally introduce bankruptcy problems and bankruptcy games.
Definition 2.4. Given an integer m > 1, a bankruptcy problem is a tuple (M,E, d), where M =
{1, . . .m} is the finite set of agents, E ≥ 0 is the estate to be divided, and d ∈ RM+ is the vector of
claims, which satisfy
∑
i∈M di ≥ E.
We denote by BP the set of all bankruptcy problems. When no confusion can arise, we will omit
the set of players and write (E, d) ∈ BP. Given a bankruptcy problem (E, d) ∈ BP, the associated
bankruptcy game
(
M,vE,d
) ∈ G is defined for every S ⊆M by
vE,d(S) = (E − d(M \ S))+ .
The worth of a coalition according to the bankruptcy game is the amount that is left after all other
claims have been satisfied, assuming there is something left over. We denote by BG the set of all
bankruptcy games obtained from bankruptcy problems. Let us illustrate the definition with the
example below.
Example 2.2. Consider the bankruptcy problem where M = {1, 2, 3}, E = 20, and d = (5, 7, 10).
The associated bankruptcy game
(
M,vE,d
)
is then given by:
vE,d({1}) = 3, vE,d({1, 2}) = 10,
vE,d({2}) = 5, vE,d({1, 3}) = 13, vE,d({1, 2, 3}) = 20.
vE,d({3}) = 8, vE,d({2, 3}) = 15,
3 Connection between assignment and bankruptcy games
In this section, we show that there exists a link between bankruptcy problems and markets.
Theorem I. The set of bankruptcy games and the set of sector games associated with markets coin-
cide, i.e.,
BG = SG.
Proof. On the one hand, for every (M,E, d) ∈ BP with M = {1, . . . ,m}, we define a market,
(c(E, d), w(E, d)) ∈ BBM, with two agents in each sector, i.e., c(E, d) ∈ R2(m−1)+ and w(E, d) ∈ R2+,
as follows:
c(E, d) =
(
dm
m− 1 , d1 +
dm
m− 1 ; . . . ;
dm
m− 1 , dm−1 +
dm
m− 1
)
,
w(E, d) = (E + dm, E).
(4)
From the definition of the bankruptcy problem, it follows that (c(E, d), w(E, d)) ∈ 2 -BBM. Indeed,
w2(E, d)−
∑
k∈M\{m}
ck2(E, d) = E −
∑
k∈M\{m}
(
dk +
dm
m− 1
)
= E −
∑
k∈M
dk ≤ 0.
Note that the exact identity of the players in (E, d) is important, as the valuations of the buyers in
(c(E, d), w(E, d)) are associated with E and the claim of the agent m in (E, d). The sectors game
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associated with (c(E, d), w(E, d)) is then defined for every S ⊆M \ {m} by
vc(E,d),w(E,d)(S) =
E −∑
k∈S
dm
m− 1 −
∑
k∈M\(S∪{m})
[
dk +
dm
m− 1
]
+
= (E − d(M \ S))+ = vE,d(S),
and
vc(E,d),w(E,d)(S ∪ {m}) =
E + dm −∑
k∈S
dm
m− 1 −
∑
k∈M\(S∪{m})
[
dk +
dm
m− 1
]
+
= (E − d(M \ (S ∪ {m})))+ = vE,d(S ∪ {m}).
On the other hand, for every (N1, . . . , Nm, c, w) ∈ 2 -BBM we define a bankruptcy problem
(E(c, w), d(c, w)), where E(c, w) ∈ R+ and d(c, w) ∈ Rm+ are as follows:
E(c, w) =
w1 − ∑
k∈M\{m}
ck1

+
,
d(c, w) =
(
c12 − c11, . . . , cm−12 − cm−11 , w1 − w2
)
.
(5)
Again, note that the agent m in (M,E(c, w), d(c, w)) is always associated with the buyers’ sectors in
(c, w). It immediately follows that (E(c, w), d(c, w)) ∈ BP. Indeed,
∑
k∈M
dk(c, w) =
∑
k∈M\{m}
(ck2 − ck1) + (w1 − w2) =
w1 − ∑
k∈M\{m}
ck1
−
w2 − ∑
k∈M\{m}
ck2

≥ w1 −
∑
k∈M\{m}
ck1 ,
where the inequality holds since (c, w) ∈ 2 -BBM. Since ∑k∈M dk(c, w) ≥ 0, we conclude that∑
k∈M dk(c, w) ≥
(
w1 −
∑
k∈M\{m} c
k
1
)
+
= E(c, w). The associated bankruptcy game is then de-
fined for every S ⊆M \ {m} by
vE(c,w),d(c,w)(S) =
w1 − ∑
k∈M\{m}
ck1

+
− (w1 − w2)−
∑
k∈M\(S∪{m})
(ck2 − ck1)

+
=
w2 −∑
k∈S
ck1 −
∑
k∈M\(S∪{m})
ck2

+
= vc,w(S)
and
vE(c,w),d(c,w)(S ∪ {m}) =
w1 − ∑
k∈M\{m}
ck1

+
−
∑
k∈M\(S∪{m})
(
ck2 − ck1
)
+
=
w1 −∑
k∈S
ck1 −
∑
k∈M\(S∪{m})
ck2

+
= vc,w(S ∪ {m}).

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Several comments are in order. First, the above theorem shows that for every game obtained
from a bankruptcy problem there exists a market whose associated sectors game is the former game,
and vice versa. For instance, the bankruptcy game of Example 2.2 corresponds to the sectors game
associated with the 2-regular market of Example 2.1.
Second, it can be verified that the mapping defined by Eq. (4) is injective but not surjective, and
that the mapping defined by Eq. (5) is surjective but not injective. Consequently, for each bankruptcy
problem, there exists a 2-regular market such that the former can be obtained from the latter via Eq.
(5). However, there are 2-regular markets such that there does not exist any bankruptcy problem
which can be transformed via Eq. (4) into the former.
Third, together with part (i) of Theorem 2.1, we have shown that the variability of the core of an
arbitrary multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game is described by the core of a bankruptcy game,
and vice versa. This latter finding raises the question whether a more general class of market games
could also be linked to the more general class of convex games. This is left to further research.
Fourth and last, a consequence of Theorem I—see also Proposition 8.1 in the Appendix—is that
the entire class of bankruptcy games can be seen as a subclass of assignment games.
Corollary 3.1. The set of assignment games associated to 2-regular markets, 2 -BBG, and the set of
bankruptcy games, BG, are isomorphic, i.e.,
BG = SG ∼= 2 -BBG ⊆ BBG.
4 Exploiting the link to define rules
In this section, we exploit the insights revealed by the connection between markets and bankruptcy
problems, and focus on point-valued solution concepts (or rules). Given H ⊆ BBM, a rule in H is
a map, f, that associates with every (N1, . . . Nm, c, w) ∈ H, a payoff vector f(c, w) = (fk(c, w))k∈M ,
where for every k ∈M , fk(c, w) = (fki (c, w))i∈Nk ∈ RNk . A rule in BP is a map, fb, that associates
with every (M,E, d) ∈ BP a payoff vector fb(E, d) = (fbi(E, d))i∈M ∈ RM .
Theorem 2.1 together with Theorem I and its proof suggest a natural procedure to define rules in
BBM based on rules in BP, and vice versa.13 On the one hand, for every rule fb in BP, we define a
rule Φ(fb) in BBM constructed for every market (c, w) ∈ BBM according to the following steps:
1. Define the market (c˜, w˜) from (c, w) by means of Eq. (2).
2. Define the bankruptcy problem (E (c˜, w˜) , d (c˜, w˜)) from (c˜, w˜) by means of Eq. (5).
3. Apply fb to the bankruptcy problem to obtain an allocation.
4. Translate the allocation of the bankruptcy problem to the original market by means of the
transformation used in Theorem 2.1.
13Theorem 2.1 is concerned with the core of the assignment game. Consequently, the translations that we present
here are especially applicable when the rule that is being translated proposes core allocations. However, to study how
properties in one setting are translated to the other setting, it is convenient to be able to translate any rule in BP into
a rule in BBM, and vice versa.
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Formally, we have defined a mapping Φ that assigns a rule in BBM to every rule fb in BP as follows:
Φ(fb)(c, w) = tc,w +Rc,w (fb (E (c˜, w˜) , d (c˜, w˜))) . (6)
On the other hand, for every rule f in BBM we conversely define a rule Ψ(f) in BP constructed
for every bankruptcy problem (E, d) ∈ BP according to the following steps:
1. Define the 2-regular market (c(E, d), w(E, d)) from (E, d) by means of Eq. (4).
2. Apply f to the 2-regular market to obtain an allocation.
3. Translate the allocation of the market to the original bankruptcy problem by taking only the
payoffs to the agents in the first position in each sector of the market.
Formally, we have defined a mapping Ψ that assigns a rule in BP to every rule f in BBM as follows:
Ψ(f)(E, d) =
(
fk1 (c(E, d), w(E, d))
)
k∈M . (7)
5 Properties of rules
In this section, we consider several properties that both rules in BBM and in BP might satisfy. We
start with some well-known properties for rules in BP, and then we propose some new properties for
rules in BBM.
5.1 Bankruptcy problems
The literature regarding properties of rules in BP is vast. Here, we consider four of them.
wd A rule in BP, fb, is well-defined if for every (E, d) ∈ BP,14
0 ≤ fi(E, d) ≤ di and
∑
i∈M
fi(E, d) = E.
The above property requires very mild assumptions, i.e., that all the estate is divided among all
the players and that none of them receives more than her claim.
co A rule in BP, fb, satisfies consistency if for every (M,E, d) ∈ BP and S ⊆ M , if we set x =
fb(M,E, d), then
xS = fb(S, x(S), dS).
The above property requires that the payoffs remain unaffected if some agents leave the problem
with the payoffs proposed by the rule, and they bargain again for the division of the joint payoff with
reference to the original claims.
14This condition is usually imposed on the definition of a rule. However, to compare rules and properties of bankruptcy
problems and markets, it is better to consider wd as a property of a rule in BP. In particular, note that the translation
Ψ may give rise to a rule in BP that is not well defined.
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bc A rule in BP, fb, satisfies bilateral consistency if for every (M,E, d) ∈ BP and S ⊆M such that
|S| = 2, if we set x = fb(M,E, d), then
xS = fb(S, x(S), dS).
The above property requires that consistency holds only for subsets of two players.
cg A rule in BP, fb, satisfies the contested garment property if for every (M,E, d) ∈ BP with
M = {1, 2},
fb(E, d) =
(
E + (E − d2)+ − (E − d1)+
2 ,
E + (E − d1)+ − (E − d2)+
2
)
.
The above property proposes a particular division of the estate for the two-claimant case based
on the concede–and–divide principle (Dagan, 1996; Moreno-Ternero and Villar, 2006).
Aumann and Maschler (1985) show that the properties listed above lead to a unique possibility.
Theorem 5.1. (Aumann and Maschler, 1985) There exists a unique rule in BP, the so-called Talmud
Bankruptcy Rule, that satisfies wd, bc, and cg. Moreover, for every bankruptcy problem this rule
chooses the nucleolus of the associated bankruptcy game.
Two comments are in order. First, the Talmud Bankruptcy Rule, henceforth Tb, admits for every
(M,E, d) ∈ BP and k ∈M the following expression:
Tbk(M,E, d) =
min
{
dk
2 , λ
}
if
∑
k∈M
dk
2 ≥ E,
dk −min
{
dk
2 , λ
}
if
∑
k∈M
dk
2 ≤ E,
where λ is chosen so that
∑
k∈M Tbk(M,E, d) = E. Second, it is well known that Tb satisfies co.
Thus, Theorem 5.1 remains valid if bc is replaced by co.
5.2 Markets
Next, we introduce and discuss a number of properties that rules in BBM might satisfy. For the
purpose of illustrating the properties, we henceforth consider the 2-regular market obtained from the
market described in Example 2.1 by means of Eq. (2).
Example 5.1. Let (c˜, w˜) be the 6-person three-sided market given by(
c˜11, c˜
1
2; c˜21, c˜22; w˜1, w˜2
)
= (50, 55; 60, 67; 130, 120).
5.2.1 Core selection
We start with a property that requires a rule to select payoffs that belong to the core of the assignment
game.
cs A rule in BBM, f, satisfies core selection if for every (c, w) ∈ BBM,
f(c, w) ∈ C(N,ωc,w).
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The above property requires a rule to share completely the spoils generated in the market, in such
a way that no coalition of agents has incentives to search for an agreement on its own. Therefore,
it can be considered a stability property. For the class of market games considered in this paper, cs
can be spelled out in two different conditions. This is shown in the next lemma.
Lemma 5.1. A rule in BBM, f, satisfies cs if and only if for every (c, w) ∈ BBM,
(i) f(c, w) = tc,w +Rc,w
((
fk1 (c˜, w˜)
)
k∈M
)
,
(ii) f(c˜, w˜) ∈ C(N,ωc˜,w˜),
where (c˜, w˜) is the 2-regular market associated with (c, w) according to Eq. (2).
Property cs has a further appeal when interpreted in terms of the money exchanged for goods
by buyers and sellers. Indeed, consider a payoff vector x =
(
(xki )i∈Nk
)
k∈M . To obtain a utility of x
k
i
when bargaining with a buyer, seller i ∈ Nk must charge a price to the buyer equal to
pki (x) = xki + cki . (8)
It turns out that there is a one-to-one correspondence between competitive prices and prices obtained
from core allocations by means of Eq. (8)—see Remark 5.1 below. To define competitive prices, we
need to introduce some concepts. Let (c, w) ∈ BBM be a market and let p = ((pki )i∈Nk)k∈M\{m}
denote a vector of prices, one for each seller.
First, given a buyer im ∈ Nm, the demand set of im at prices p, which we denote by Dim(p), is
the set of tuples (i1, . . . , im−1) ∈ N1 × · · · ×Nm−1 which maximize wim −
∑
k∈M\{m} p
k
ik
, whenever
this last expression is positive. Otherwise, Dim(p) is the empty set.
Second, a vector of prices p is quasi-competitive if
(i) pki ≥ cki , for every i ∈ Nk and k ∈M \ {m}, and
(ii) there is a matching µ ∈ M(N1, . . . , Nm), which is said to be compatible with p, such that for
every buyer im ∈ Nm,
Dim(p) 6= ∅ ⇒ ∃(i1, . . . , im−1) ∈ Dim(p) such that (i1, . . . , im−1, im) ∈ µ.
Third, a pair (p, µ) ∈∏k∈M\{m} RNk ×M(N1, . . . , Nm) is a competitive equilibrium if
(i) p is a quasi-competitive vector of prices,
(ii) µ is a matching compatible with p, and
(iii) pki = cki for every seller i ∈ Nk, with k ∈ M \ {m}, such that i is assigned under µ to a buyer
with an empty demand set.
Given a competitive equilibrium (p, µ), we say that the price p is competitive. Building on part (i) of
Theorem 2.1, we can formulate the main result in Tejada (2010) for the class of markets considered
in the paper, which reads as follows:
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Remark 5.1. Given (c, w) ∈ BBM, the following two statements are equivalent:
(a) p is a vector of competitive prices,
(b) there exists x ∈ C(N,ωc,w) and p(x) = (p1(x), . . . , pm−1(x)) ∈ RM\{m}+ such that for every
k ∈M \ {m} and i ∈ Nk,
pki =
pk(x) = xki + cki if i ≤ r,cki if i > r.
Whenever x ∈ C(N,ωc,w), it holds that xki + cki = xkj + ckj for all i, j ∈ Nk such that i, j ≤ r.
In what follows, for every k ∈ M \ {m} we let pk(x) ∈ R+ denote the price of the commodity k at
allocation x. We stress that whenever x is a core allocation of the assignment game, the vector p(x),
with components pk(x) = xk1 + ck1 , collects the prices paid in any actual transaction that occurs in
the market. Using Theorem 2.1, we find that the set of competitive prices of the market of Example
5.1 is {(
p1, p2
)
: 53 ≤ p1 ≤ 55, 65 ≤ p2 ≤ 67, 120 ≤ p1 + p2 ≤ 122} .
The remaining properties introduced in this section refer only to 2-regular markets.
5.2.2 Vertical syndication-proof
Suppose that prices in a market are determined according to a certain rule in BBM, f, which satisfies
cs.15 Let also p(x) = (p1(x), p2(x)) be the current price level in the market of Example 5.1, with
x = f(c˜, w˜). Then, assume that the following occurs: (i) the active firm in sector 1 buys the good
from the active firm in sector 2 at price p2(x), (ii) the inactive firm in sector 1 buys the good from
the inactive firm in sector 2 at price p2(x), and (iii) both firms in sector 1 offer the buyers a bundle
composed of the two goods that each of them owns. The firms that sold their products no longer
participate directly in the market. Other potential side-payments may nonetheless occur between all
firms. This yields the following two-sided market:
Example 5.1 (cont.). Let (N1, N3, α1, w˜) be the 2-sided 2-regular market given by(
α11, α
1
2; w˜1, w˜2
)
=
(
50 + p2(x), 55 + p2(x); 130, 120
)
,
where x = f (c˜, w˜).
The reduced market
(
α1, w˜
)
, with α1 =
(
α11, α
1
2
)
, captures the situation where one syndicate
is formed between the two active firms and another between the two inactive firms. As the latter
syndicate will not sell its bundle when prices are competitive, only one operative syndicate will
actually form. In this new setting, a consumer can only buy the two-commodity bundled good but
none of the goods separately. A cardinal question regarding the reduced market is: Who benefits
and who loses in
(
α1, w˜
)
with respect to the original market (c˜, w˜) if prices are chosen according
to f in both markets? To answer this question, we have to compare sellers’ and buyers’ payoffs in
15We impose that f satisfies cs to facilitate the explanation of the property.
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both settings. Doing so in real-world applications may be relevant for consumers, firms, and antitrust
authorities.
The property below requires that buyers be indifferent to the two above situations.
2-vsp A rule in BBM, f, satisfies vertical syndication-proofness for 2-regular markets if for every
(N1, . . . , Nm, c, w) ∈ 2 -BBM and k ∈M \ {m},
fm
(
N1, . . . , Nm, c, w
)
= fm
(
Nk, Nm, αk(c, w, f), w
)
,
where the reduced two-sided market
(
Nk, Nm, αk(c, w, f), w
)
is composed of the original sector
of buyers, with valuations given by w, and a unique sector of sellers with costs, αk(c, w, f),
defined for every i ∈ Nk by16
αki (c, w, f) = cki +
∑
l∈M\{k,m}
pl(f(c, w)). (9)
Four comments are in order. First, the bargaining power in the 2-sided market
(
αk(c, w, f), w
)
of the unique sector of firms coincides with the bargaining power of sector k in the original market
(c, w). Moreover, such a coincidence is independent of f by construction. Trivially, the same holds
for the buyers. Second, 2-vsp relates the payoffs in a multi-sided market to the payoffs in a two-sided
market. While the literature on bilateral assignment markets is large, comparatively few papers
study multi-sided assignment markets. We are not aware of any property described in the literature
which would connect the multilateral to the bilateral case. Third, if f satisfies cs, the set of 2-regular
markets is closed under the reduced market operator.
Lemma 5.2. Let (c, w) ∈ 2 -BBM. If a rule, f, satisfies cs then
(i)
(
Nk, Nm, αk(c, w, f), w
) ∈ 2 -BBM for every k ∈M \ {m}.
(ii) If (N,ωc,w) = (N, v0) then
(
Nk ∪Nm, ωαk(c,w,f),w
)
= (N, v0).
Fourth and last, 2-vsp requires that the buyers’ surplus is not affected by the creation of vertical
syndicates. It is interesting also to investigate the incentives of sellers to create such syndicates.
Lemma 5.3 below shows that when applied to a rule f that satisfies cs, 2-vsp requires that any active
(resp. inactive) seller be indifferent to the following two options: (i) syndicating with m − 2 other
active (resp. inactive) sellers, each owning a different commodity, compensating them with the price
prescribed by f, and then bargaining directly with the buyers, and (ii) not creating such a syndicate.
Lemma 5.3. If a rule in BBM, f, satisfies cs and 2-vsp, then for every (c, w) ∈ 2 -BBM and every
k ∈M \ {m},
fk(c, w) = fk
(
αk(c, w, f), w
)
.
16For the sake of understanding the property, we do not rename this unique sector of sellers, as it should be denoted
by N1 instead of Nk. An analogous comment applies to the sector of buyers. Also note that both the active seller and
the inactive seller pay the same price. In particular, the inactive seller may be paying prices to other sellers that are
below their costs.
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We have assumed that the sellers who are not present in the reduced market receive, according to
2-vsp, the payoff prescribed by f in the original market—by means of the corresponding competitive
price. Lemma 5.3 thus asserts that the total payoff of all active (or inactive) sellers should not be
affected by the creation of the vertical syndicates. Indeed, it follows from Lemma 5.3 that under cs
and 2-vsp, for every (c, w) ∈ 2 -BBM and i ∈ Nk,∑
l∈M\{m}
fli(c, w) = fki
(
αk(c, w, f), w
)
+
∑
l∈M\{k,m}
fli(c, w). (10)
As a consequence, under cs and 2-vsp there are no incentives for the creation of vertical syndicates
in 2-regular markets.17
5.2.3 Compromise in the bilateral case
For bilateral markets, the core is a segment determined by both the buyers- and the sellers-optimal
allocations. There seems to be a widespread consensus that the fairest solution to such a market game
is the midpoint of the core. This allocation not only is the average between the two aforementioned
polar allocations, but it also coincides with the nucleolus and the τ -value—see Núñez and Rafels
(2005). The following property requires that for every bilateral 2-regular market the midpoint of the
core be selected.
2-cbs A rule in BBM, f, coincides with the canonical bilateral solution for bilateral 2-regular markets
if for every 2-sided market (c, w) ∈ 2 -BBM,
f1(c, w) =
((
w1 − c11
)
+ +
(
w2 − c11
)
+ −
(
w1 − c12
)
+
2 , 0
)
, and
f2(c, w) =
((
w1 − c11
)
+ +
(
w1 − c12
)
+ −
(
w2 − c11
)
+
2 , 0
)
.
(11)
5.2.4 Anonymity with respect to the bargaining power
In Section 2 we have defined the bargaining power of each sector in a 2-regular market. The property
below requires that in 2-regular markets, traders—be they firms or consumers—be treated equally
with regard to bargaining power.
2-abp A rule in BBM, f, satisfies anonymity with respect to bargaining power for 2-regular markets if
for every two markets (c, w), (cˆ, wˆ) ∈ 2 -BBM with the same total surplus w1−
∑
k∈M\{m} c
k
1 =
wˆ1 −
∑
k∈M\{m} cˆ
k
1 , if there is k ∈M \ {m} such that bk(c, w) = bm(cˆ, wˆ), bm(c, w) = bk(cˆ, wˆ),
and bl(c, w) = bl(cˆ, wˆ) for all l ∈M \ {k,m}, then
fl(cˆ, wˆ) =

fm(c, w) if l = k,
fk(c, w) if l = m,
fl(c, w) otherwise.
17At this point, the question whether or not to require Eq. (10) to hold with a weak inequality arises. The answer
to this question falls outside the scope of the current paper. In Knudsen and Østerdal (2012) merging and splitting
incentives are studied separately for arbitrary cooperative games.
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6 Exploiting the link: a characterization result
In this section, we do two things. First, we study the relation between the properties presented in
the previous section for bankruptcy problems and markets. Second, we characterize the unique rule
that satisfies, among other properties, our proposed notion of vertical syndication-proofness.
6.1 Translating properties
First, we study the translation of properties from the domain of markets to the domain of bankruptcy
problems.
Proposition 6.1. Let f be a rule in BBM and Ψ the mapping defined in Eq. (7).
(i) If f satisfies cs, then Ψ(f) satisfies wd.
(ii) If f satisfies 2-cbs, then Ψ(f) satisfies cg.
(iii) If f satisfies cs, 2-cbs, 2-vsp, and 2-abp, then Ψ(f) satisfies bc.
Proof.
Let fb = Ψ(f) and (E, d) ∈ BP. Throughout the proof, let also N1, . . . , Nm denote the sets
of agents of the market obtained from (E, d) via Eq. (4) and N = N1 ∪ · · · ∪ Nm. Recall that
(c(E, d), w(E, d)) ∈ 2 -BBM.
For part (i), assume that f satisfies cs. Then,∑
k∈M
fbk(E, d) =
∑
k∈M
fk1 (c(E, d), w(E, d)) = ωc(E,d),w(E,d)(N) = E,
where the first equality holds by definition of Ψ in Eq. (7), the second equality holds since f satisfies
cs, and the last equality holds by Eq. (4). Moreover, since a player’s payoff in the core is bounded
from below by her stand-alone worth and from above by her marginal contribution to the grand
coalition, we obtain that for every k ∈M \ {m},
0 ≤ fbk(E, d) = fk1 (c(E, d), w(E, d)) ≤ ωc(E,d),w(E,d)(N)− ωc(E,d),w(E,d)
(
N \ {1k})
=
w1(E, d)− ∑
l∈M\{m}
cl1(E, d)

+
−
w1(E, d)− ∑
l∈M\{k,m}
cl1(E, d)− ck2(E, d)

+
≤ ck2(E, d)− ck1(E, d) = dk,
and
0 ≤ fbm(E, d) = fm1 (c(E, d), w(E, d)) ≤ ωc(E,d),w(E,d)(N)− ωc(E,d),w(E,d) (N \ {1m})
=
w1(E, d)− ∑
l∈M\{m}
cl1(E, d)

+
−
w2(E, d)− ∑
l∈M\{m}
cl1(E, d)

+
≤ w1(E, d)− w2(E, d) = dm,
where 1k denotes the first agent in sector k ∈M . Hence, Ψ(f) satisfies wd.
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For part (ii), assume that f satisfies 2-cbs. Then, let (M,E, d) ∈ BP be such that M = {1, 2}.
By Eq. (4) and the fact that f satisfies 2-cbs, it follows that
fb1(E, d) =
1
2
( (
w1(E, d)− c11(E, d)
)
+ +
(
w2(E, d)− c11(E, d)
)
+ −
(
w1(E, d)− c12(E, d)
)
+
)
= 12
(
E + (E − d2)+ − (E − d1)+
)
.
We can repeat the same argument for the second player in the bankruptcy problem and obtain
fb2(E, d) = 12
(
E + (E − d1)+ − (E − d2)+
)
. Hence, Ψ(f) satisfies cg.
Finally, for part (iii) assume that f satisfies cs, 2-cbs, 2-vsp, and 2-abp. In the following, we
show that fb is bilaterally consistent. To ease the notation, let henceforth yk = fbk(M,E, d) for every
k ∈M . Let S ⊆M be such that |S| = 2. We distinguish two cases.
Case A: m ∈ S
Accordingly, S = {k,m} for some k ∈ M \ {m}. For l ∈ {k,m}, let zl = fbl({k,m}, yk +
ym, (dk, dm)). On the one hand, by Eq. (4),
c (yk + ym, (dk, dm)) = (dm, dm + dk) and
w (yk + ym, (dk, dm)) = (yk + ym + dm, yk + ym) .
By definition of Ψ and the fact that f satisfies 2-cbs, we obtain
zk =
1
2 (yk + ym + (yk + ym − dm)+ − (yk + ym − dk)+) and
zm =
1
2 (yk + ym + (yk + ym − dk)+ − (yk + ym − dm)+) .
On the other hand, by definition of Ψ in Eq. (7), the fact that f satisfies 2-vsp, and Lemma 5.3, we
have for l ∈ {k,m},
yl = fl1 (c(E, d), w(E, d)) = fl1
(
αk (c(E, d), w(E, d), f) , w(E, d)
)
. (12)
Note that the right-hand side of Eq. (12) involves a bilateral market. By Eq. (9),
αk (c(E, d), w(E, d), f) =
(
ck1(E, d) +
∑
l∈M\{k,m}
[
cl1(E, d) + fl1(c(E, d), w(E, d))
]
ck2(E, d) +
∑
l∈M\{k,m}
[
cl1(E, d) + fl1(c(E, d), w(E, d))
]). (13)
Since f satisfies cs,∑
l∈M\{k,m}
fl1(c(E, d), w(E, d)) = ωc(E,d),w(E,d)(N)−
∑
l∈{k,m}
fl1(c(E, d), w(E, d)) = E − yk − ym,
where the last equality holds by the definition of the assignment game and Eq. (4). Then, using Eq.
(4) and the equation above, Eq. (13) becomes
αk (c(E, d), w(E, d), f) =
(
dm + E − yk − ym
dm + dk + E − yk − ym
)
. (14)
Finally, since f satisfies 2-cbs, Eqs. (12) and (14) yield
yk =
1
2 (yk + ym + (yk + ym − dm)+ − (yk + ym − dk)+) and
ym =
1
2 (yk + ym + (yk + ym − dk)+ − (yk + ym − dm)+) .
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That is, we have proved that yl = zl for l ∈ {k,m}.
Case B: m /∈ S
Hence, S = {k, l} with k, l ∈ M \ {m} and k 6= l. Consider the auxiliary bankruptcy problem
(E, d′) ∈ BP defined by d′l = dm, d′m = dl, and d′h = dh for all h ∈M \{l,m}. Denote y′h = fbh(E, d′)
for all h ∈ M . Let c′ = c(E, d′) and w′ = w(E, d′). Since f satisfies 2-abp, we can apply such a
property to markets (c(E, d), w(E, d)) and (c′, w′) to obtain
yk = fk1 (c(E, d), w(E, d)) = fk1 (c′, w′) = y′k and
yl = fll (c(E, d), w(E, d)) = fm1 (c′, w′) = y′m.
(15)
In particular, note that
yk + yl = y′k + y′m. (16)
Moreover, let z′h = fbh ({k,m}, y′k + y′m, (d′k, d′m)) for h ∈ {k,m}. Then, from Case A we know that
y′k = z′k and y′m = z′m. (17)
Since by part (ii) fb satisfies cg, we have
z′k =
1
2 (y
′
k + y′m + (y′k + y′m − d′m)+ − (y′k + y′m − d′k)+) and
z′m =
1
2 (y
′
k + y′m + (y′k + y′m − d′k)+ − (y′k + y′m − d′m)+) .
Next, let zh = fbh({k, l}, yk + yl, (dk, dl)) for h ∈ {k, l}. Again because fb satisfies cg,
zk =
1
2 (yk + yl + (yk + yl − dl)+ − (yk + yl − dk)+) and
zl =
1
2 (yk + yl + (yk + yl − dk)+ − (yk + yl − dl)+) .
Then, by Eq. (16) and taking into account that d′l = dm and d′m = dl, it follows that
z′k = zk and z′m = zl. (18)
Lastly, it follows from Eqs. (15), (17), and (18) that yh = zh for l ∈ {k, l}, so the proof is complete.

Second, we study the translation of properties from the domain of bankruptcy problems to that
of markets.
Proposition 6.2. Let fb be a rule in BP and Φ the mapping defined in Eq. (6).
(i) If fb satisfies cg, then Φ(fb) satisfies 2-cbs.
(ii) If fb satisfies wd, cg, and bc, then Φ(fb) satisfies cs, 2-vsp, and 2-abp.
Proof.
Let fb be a rule in BP and f = Φ(fb). By Lemma 5.1 and construction of Φ in Eq. (6), it follows
that f satisfies cs if it associates a core allocation with every 2-regular market. Since 2-cbs, 2-vsp,
and 2-abp only apply to 2-regular markets, we henceforth assume that (c, w) ∈ 2 -BBM. Note in
particular that by construction of Φ in Eq. (6), it follows that for every sector k ∈M , fk2 (c, w) = 0.
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For part (i), let (N1, N2, c, w) ∈ 2 -BBM be a bilateral 2-regular market. Since fb satisfies cg,
f11 (c, w) = fb1(E(c, w), d(c, w)) =
1
2 (E(c, w) + (E(c, w)− d2(c, w))+ − (E(c, w)− d1(c, w))+)
= 12
(
(w1 − c11)+ + (w2 − c11)+ − (w1 − c12)+
)
.
Following an analogous argument for the sector of buyers yields
f21 (c, w) =
1
2
(
(w1 − c11)+ + (w1 − c12)+ − (w2 − c11)+
)
.
Hence, f satisfies 2-cbs.
For part (ii), suppose that fb satisfies wd, cg, and bc. By Theorem 5.1, fb selects the nucleolus
of the bankruptcy game induced by any bankruptcy problem. If r(c, w) = 0, we have (N,ωc,w) =
(N, v0), so f satisfies cs, 2-vsp, and 2-abp. We thus focus for the rest of the proof on the case where
r(c, w) 6= 0. First, we show that f satisfies cs. Note that part (i) of Theorem 2.1 implies that
f(c, w) ∈ C(N,ωc,w)⇔ (fk1 (c, w))k∈M ∈ C(M,vc,w)⇔ fb(E(c, w), d(c, w)) ∈ C(M,vc,w).
Therefore, from Theorem I—and its proof—and the fact that the nucleolus is always a core allocation,
we deduce that f(c, w) ∈ C(N,ωc,w).
Second, to show that f satisfies 2-vsp, let yl = fl1(c, w) for all l ∈M . By construction of Φ in Eq.
(6), we have y = fb(E(c, w), d(c, w)). Let (Nk, Nm, αk(c, w, f), w) be the reduced bilateral 2-regular
market obtained from (c, w), with k ∈ M \ {m}. Let zl = fl1(Nk, Nm, αk(c, w, f), w) for l ∈ {k,m}.
By definition of the costs of the reduced market—see Eq. (9)—,
αk1(c, w, f) = ck1 +
∑
l∈M\{k,m}
(cl1 + yl) = w1 − yk − ym,
where the last holds since f satisfies cs. Similarly,
αk2(c, w, f) = w1 + ck2 − ck1 − yk − ym.
Using Eq. (5), we obtain
E
(
αk(c, w, f), w
)
= w1 − αk1(c, w, f) = yk + ym,
dk
(
αk(c, w, f), w
)
= ck2 − ck1 = dk(c, w), and
dm
(
αk(c, w, f), w
)
= w1 − w2 = dm(c, w).
By construction of Φ in Eq. (6) and the fact that fb satisfies bc, it follows from the above equations
that for l ∈ {k,m},
zl = fbl({k,m}, yk + ym, (dk(c, w)), dm(c, w)) = fbl(M,E(c, w), d(c, w)) = yl.
Thus, f satisfies 2-vsp.
Third, to show that f satisfies 2-abp, let (c, w) and (cˆ, wˆ) be as in the definition of 2-abp. Then
(N,ωc,w) is obtained from (N,ωcˆ,wˆ) by exchanging the roles of players in the sectors k and m. Since
the nucleolus is an anonymous solution concept, part (ii) of Theorem 2.1 implies that f satisfies
2-abp.18 
18A point- or set-valued solution concept f is anonymous if for all (N, v) ∈ G and i ∈ N , it holds that fpi(i)(N, piv) =
fi(N, v), where pi : N → N is a permutation and piv(S) = v(pi(S)) for all S ⊆ N .
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6.2 The main result
Next, we prove the paper’s main result. It is convenient to define the rule obtained by translating
the Talmud Bankruptcy Rule.
Definition 6.1. The Talmud Assignment Rule, T, is the rule in BBM defined as the transformation
using Φ of the Talmud Bankruptcy Rule, i.e., T = Φ(Tb).
We are now in a position to state and prove the theorem.
Theorem II. The Talmud Assignment Rule is the unique rule in BBM that satisfies cs, 2-vsp,
2-abp, and 2-cbs. Moreover, it selects for every market the nucleolus of the associated assignment
game.
Proof.
The proof proceeds in three steps. First, we show that if there is a rule in BBM satisfying cs,
2-vsp, 2-cbs, and 2-abp, then it must be unique. Second, we show that there is a rule in BBM,
namely T, that satisfies the four properties. Third, we show that these four properties do in fact
single out the nucleolus of the market games in BBG.
Step 1: Uniqueness
Let f be a rule in BBM that satisfies cs, 2-vsp, 2-cbs, and 2-abp. First, let H be the set of
2-regular markets obtained from bankruptcy problems via Eq. (4), i.e.,
H = {(c, w) ∈ 2-BBM : ∃(E, d) ∈ BP s.t. (c, w) = (c(E, d), w(E, d))} . (19)
Since the mappings c(E, d) and w(E, d) are not surjective, H ( 2 -BBM. We show that f is the only
rule in H satisfying the four properties. Indeed, let (c, w) ∈ H. Then, there is (E, d) ∈ BP such that
for all k ∈M ,
fk1 (c, w) = fk1 (c(E, d), w(E, d)) = Ψ(f)k(E, d), (20)
where the last equality holds by definition of Ψ in Eq. (7). Since f satisfies cs, 2-vsp, 2-cbs, and
2-abp, it follows from Proposition 6.1 that Ψ(f) satisfies wd, bc, and cg, which implies by Theorem
5.1 the uniqueness of the payoffs in Eq. (20).
Second, from Lemma 5.1, we know that a rule in BBM that satisfies cs is uniquely defined for
all (c, w) ∈ BBM if and only if it is uniquely defined for all (c, w) ∈ 2-BBM. Thus, henceforth, we
restrict our attention to 2 -BBM. Moreover, cs also implies that for all (c, w) ∈ 2-BBM and k ∈M ,
fk2 (c, w) = 0. As a consequence, we only need to show the uniqueness of f11 (c, w), . . . , fm1 (c, w).
Third, we define several binary relations in 2 -BBM based on the relation between the markets
in the definition of 2-abp. Consider two arbitrary 2-regular markets (c, w), (cˆ, wˆ) ∈ 2 -BBM. On the
one hand, let k ∈M \ {m}. Then,
(c, w) ∼k (cˆ, wˆ)⇔

w1 −
∑
l∈M\{m}
cl1 = wˆ1 −
∑
l∈M\{m}
cˆl1,
ck2 − ck1 = wˆ1 − wˆ2,
w1 − w2 = cˆk2 − cˆk1 , and
cl2 − cl1 = cˆl2 − cˆl1 for every l ∈M \ {k,m}.
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Similarly,
(c, w) ∼m (cˆ, wˆ)⇔

w1 −
∑
k∈M\{m}
ck1 = wˆ1 −
∑
k∈M\{m}
cˆk1 ,
w1 − w2 = wˆ1 − wˆ2, and
cl2 − cl1 = cˆl2 − cˆl1 for every l ∈M \ {m}.
On the other hand,
(c, w) ∼ (cˆ, wˆ)⇔ (c, w) ∼k (cˆ, wˆ) for some k ∈M.
Note that ∼ is an equivalence relation. For convenience, for a given k ∈M , let pik be the permutation
of M defined by pik(k) = m, pik(m) = k, and for every l ∈M \ {k,m}, pik(l) = l.
Fourth, given an arbitrary (c, w) ∈ 2 -BBM, let (c′, w′) ∈ H be defined by19
c′ = c (E(c, w), d(c, w)) and w′ = w (E(c, w), d(c, w)) . (21)
It is straightforward to verify that the sectors games associated with the above markets coincide, i.e.,
that (M,vc,w) =
(
M, vc
′,w′
)
.
The remainder of the proof is devoted to showing that for every (c, w) ∈ 2 -BBM \ H, f(c, w) =
f(c′, w′). To that purpose, we assume on the contrary that there exists a market (c∗, w∗) ∈ 2 -BBM\H
such that
f(c∗, w∗) 6= f((c∗)′, (w∗)′), (22)
where ((c∗)′, (w∗)′) ∈ H is obtained from (c∗, w∗) as in Eq. (21). We shall reach a contradiction.
Consider now the rule g in 2 -BBM defined for every (c, w) ∈ 2 -BBM and l ∈M as follows:
gl(c, w) =
fpi
k(l)(c∗, w∗) if (c, w) ∼k (c∗, w∗), for some k ∈M,
fl(c′, w′) if (c, w)  (c∗, w∗), where (c′, w′) ∈ H is as defined in Eq. (21).
We shall show that g satisfies cs, 2-vsp, 2-abp, and 2-cbs. The following two claims will be
helpful.
Claim A. Let (c, w), (c¯, w¯) ∈ 2 -BBM be two 2-sided 2-regular markets with the same total surplus
and same bargaining powers, i.e., w1 − c11 = w¯1 − c¯11, b1(c, w) = b1(c¯, w¯), and b2(c, w) = b2(c¯, w¯). If
f is a rule in 2 -BBM satisfying 2-cbs, then f(c, w) = f(c¯, w¯).
Claim B. Let (c, w), (c¯, w¯) ∈ 2 -BBM be two 2-sided 2-regular markets with the same total surplus
and switched bargaining powers, i.e., w1 − c11 = w¯1 − c¯11, b1(c, w) = b2(c¯, w¯), and b2(c, w) = b1(c¯, w¯).
If f is a rule in 2 -BBM satisfying 2-cbs, then f1(c, w) = f2(c¯, w¯) and f2(c, w) = f1(c¯, w¯).
Note that because f satisfies 2-cbs, the market (c∗, w∗) must have at least three sides, i.e., m > 2.
Otherwise Claim A applied to rule f and markets (c∗, w∗) and ((c∗)′, (w∗)′) contradicts Eq. (22).
Next we proceed to prove that g satisfies the four properties. With regard to cs, note that when-
ever (c, w) ∼k (cˆ, wˆ), (M,vcˆ,wˆ) can be obtained from (M, vc,w) by permuting the players according
to pik. Then, g satisfies cs by Theorem 2.1 and the following facts: f satisfies cs and the core is
an anonymous solution concept. Moreover, g satisfies 2-cbs trivially because f does so. It is also
19We abuse notation and do not write the dependence of c′ and w′ on the market (c, w). This spares us the use of
some cumbersome expressions.
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straightforward to verify that by construction, g satisfies 2-abp. Then, it remains to prove that g
satisfies 2-vsp. Let (c, w) ∈ 2 -BBM and k ∈M \ {m}. We distinguish three cases.
Case A: (c, w)  (c∗, w∗).
Then,
gm(c, w) = fm(c′, w′) = fm
(
αk(c′, w′, f), w′
)
= fm
((
αk(c, w, g)
)′
, w′
)
= gm
(
αk(c, w, g), w
)
,
where the first and last equalities hold by definition of g, and the second equality holds because f sat-
isfies 2-vsp. The third equality follows from Claim A applied to rule f and markets
(
αk(c′, w′, f), w′
)
and
((
αk(c, w, g)
)′
, w′
)
, and is explained as follows: On the one hand, the two markets have the
same firms’ bargaining power. Indeed,
αk2(c′, w′, f)− αk1(c′, w′, f) = (c′)k2 − (c′)k1 = ck2 − ck1 = αk2(c, w, g)− αk1(c, w, g)
=
(
αk(c, w, g)
)′
2 −
(
αk(c, w, g)
)′
1 ,
where the first and third equalities are obtained using Eq. (9), and the second and last equalities
follow from Eq. (21). On the other hand, using the definition of g, it follows from immediate algebraic
manipulations that(
w′1 − αk1(c′, w′, f)
)
+ = f
k
1 (c′, w′) + fm1 (c′, w′) =
(
w′1 −
(
αk(c, w, g)
)′
1
)
+
.
Therefore, the surplus of the two markets is the same.
Case B: (c, w) ∼m (c∗, w∗).
Then,
gm(c, w) = fm(c∗, w∗) = fm
(
αk(c∗, w∗, f), w∗
)
= fm
((
αk(c, w, g)
)′
, w′
)
= gm
(
αk(c, w, g), w
)
,
where the first and last equalities hold by definition of g, and the second equality holds because f satis-
fies 2-vsp. The third equality is due to Claim A being applied to rule f and markets
(
αk(c∗, w∗, f), w∗
)
and
((
αk(c, w, g)
)′
, w′
)
, and is explained as follows: On the one hand, both markets have the same
firms’ bargaining power. Indeed,
αk2(c∗, w∗, f)− αk1(c∗, w∗, f) = (c∗)k2 − (c∗)k1 = ck2 − ck1 = αk2(c, w, g)− αk1(c, w, g)
=
(
αk(c, w, g)
)′
2 −
(
αk(c, w, g)
)′
1 ,
where the first and third equalities are obtained using Eq. (9), the second equality is due to the fact
that (c, w) ∼m (c∗, w∗), and the fourth equality holds by Eq. (21). Moreover,
w∗1 − w∗2 = w1 − w2 = w′1 − w′2,
where the first equality holds because (c, w) ∼m (c∗, w∗), and the second equality follows from Eq.
(21). On the other hand, the surplus of the two markets is the same. Indeed, due to definition of g
and Eq. (21), by straightforward algebraic manipulations we obtain(
w∗1 − αk1(c∗, w∗, f)
)
+ = f
k
1 (c∗, w∗) + fm1 (c∗, w∗) = gk1(c, w) + gm1 (c, w)
=
(
w1 − αk1(c, w, g)
)
+ =
(
w′1 − αk1(c, w, g)′
)
+ .
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Case C: (c, w) ∼l (c∗, w∗) for some l ∈M \ {m}.
The proof of gm(c, w) = gm
(
αk(c, w, g), w
)
proceeds by showing two chains of equalities, which
yield the desired result when appended. The first chain is
gm(c, w) = fl(c∗, w∗) = fl
(
αl (c∗, w∗, f) , w∗
)
= fm
(
αl(c, w, f), w
)
= fm(c, w), (23)
where the first equality holds by definition of g, the second equality follows from the fact that f
satisfies 2-vsp and cs—and hence Lemma 5.3—, and the last equality holds because f satisfies 2-vsp.
The third equality follows from application of Claim B to rule f and markets
(
αl (c∗, w∗, f) , w∗
)
and(
αl(c, w, f), w
)
. Indeed,
w∗1 − w∗2 = cl2 − cl1 = αl2(c, w, f)− αl1(c, w, f),
where the first equality holds because (c, w) ∼l (c∗, w∗) and the second equality follows from Eq. (9).
Similarly,
αl2 (c∗, w∗, f)− αl1 (c∗, w∗, f) = (c∗)l2 − (c∗)l1 = w1 − w2,
where the first equality follows from Eq. (9) and the second equality holds because (c, w) ∼l (c∗, w∗).
That is, both markets have switched bargaining powers. Moreover, the total surplus is equal to
fm1 (c∗, w∗) + fl1(c∗, w∗) and fl1(c, w) + fm1 (c, w), respectively. Since (c, w) ∼l (c∗, w∗) and f satisfies
2-abp, both quantities coincide. On the other hand, the second chain of equalities is
fm(c, w) = fm
(
αk(c, w, f), w
)
= fm
((
αk(c, w, g)
)′
, w′
)
= gm
(
αk(c, w, g), w
)
, (24)
where the first equality holds because f satisfies 2-vsp, the last equality is by definition of g, and
the second equality is consequence of applying Claim A to rule f and markets
(
αk(c, w, f), w
)
and((
αk(c, w, g)
)′
, w′
)
. Indeed, by Eq. (21) it immediately follows that both markets have the same
bargaining powers and that their total surplus is equal to fk1 (c, w)+ fm1 (c, w) and gk1(c, w)+gm1 (c, w),
respectively. We next show that the two latter quantities coincide. Together with Eqs. (23) and (24),
this will imply that g satisfies 2-vsp. To show the latter claim, we distinguish two cases.
Case C.I: k = l. In this case,
gk(c, w) + gm(c, w) =gm(c∗, w∗) + gk(c∗, w∗) = fm(c∗, w∗) + fk(c∗, w∗)
=fk(c, w) + fm(c, w),
where the first two equalities hold by definition of g, and the last equality holds since f satisfies
2-abp.
Case C.II: k 6= l. In this case,
gk(c, w) + gm(c, w) =gk(c∗, w∗) + gl(c∗, w∗) = fk(c∗, w∗) + fl(c∗, w∗)
=fk(c, w) + fm(c, w),
where the first two equalities hold by definition of g, and the last equality holds since f satisfies
2-abp.
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Finally, since g satisfies the four properties, f and g must coincide in H. In particular,
f (c∗, w∗) = g (c∗, w∗) = g ((c∗)′, (w∗)′) = f ((c∗)′, (w∗)′) ,
where the first equality holds by definition of g, the second is due to the fact that, by Eq. (21),
((c∗)′, (w∗)′) ∼m (c∗, w∗), and the third equality holds since ((c∗)′, (w∗)′) ∈ H. As a consequence,
Eq. (22) cannot hold, and the proof is complete.
Step 2: Existence
To demonstrate that cs, 2-vsp, 2-abp, and 2-cbs are compatible properties for rules in BBM is
straightforward. Indeed, from Theorem 5.1 and Proposition 6.2 it immediately follows that T = Φ(Tb)
satisfies the four properties.
Step 3: The characterization result
Given the results in the previous two steps, to prove the theorem it only remains to show that
T selects the nucleolus of the associated assignment game. Indeed, by part (ii) of Theorem 2.1 and
Theorem I—together with its proof—we know that T selects for every (c, w) ∈ BBM the nucleolus
of (N, vc,w). 
Theorem II shows that 2-vsp—together with the other three properties—leads to a solution, T,
constructed for every (c, w) ∈ BBM in two steps. First, the information contained in the rows r and
r + 1 of (c, w) is used to construct the sectors game, for which the nucleolus is calculated. Second,
the information in the remaining rows of (c, w) is used by the replica operator and the translation
vector to obtain the payoffs for all agents of (c, w).
We make two further remarks. First, as a corollary of Theorem II we obtain that for any rule in
BBM, f, other than T there might be incentives for sellers owning different commodities to collude
and create a vertical syndicate. Second, no property can be excluded from the characterization of T
in Theorem II—, as shown in Proposition 8.2 in the Appendix.
7 Other forms of syndication
In this section, we present one positive result and one impossibility result. First, we show that
the Talmud Assignment Rule satisfies a stronger version of 2-vsp. This property applies to general
markets and permits vertical syndicates with an arbitrary number of members. Second, we show
that among the solution concepts that satisfy 2-cbs, cs, and 2-abp, none simultaneously satisfies our
notions of vertical and horizontal syndication-proofness—see below.
Let us formalize the properties just described. We start with a possible extension of 2-vsp. Given
S ⊆M \ {m}, let NM\(S∪{m}) = (N l)l∈M\(S∪{m}) and cM\(S∪{m}) = (cl)l∈M\(S∪{m}).20
svsp A rule in BBM, f, satisfies strong vertical syndication-proofness if for every (c, w) ∈ BBM,
every ∅ 6= S ⊆M \ {m}, and every k ∈ S, we have that for every j ∈M \ S,
fj(N1, . . . , Nm, c, w) = fj
(
Nk, NM\(S∪{m}), Nm, βk(c, w, f, S), cM\(S∪{m}), w
)
, (25)
20In line with part (i) of Lemma 5.2, it can be verified that the reduced market in the definition of svsp is a 2-regular
market whenever f satisfies cs and (c, w) ∈ 2 -BBM.
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where the reduced (m− |S|+ 1)-sided market in the right-hand side of Eq. (25) is composed of
the original sector of buyers, with valuations given by w, of the original sectors of sellers N l,
with l ∈ M \ (S ∪ {m}), with costs given by (cl)l∈M\(S∪{m}), and a new sector of sellers, Nk,
with costs, βk(c, w, f, S) defined for every i ∈ Nk by
βki (c, w, f, S) = cki +
∑
l∈S\{k}
pl(f(c, w)).
Recall that for the markets under consideration, the interests of all agents in one sector are
completely aligned in competitive prices. This implies that there is an incentive to create a vertical
syndicate for some sellers if and only if there is an incentive to create a vertical syndicate for all active
sellers in the sectors to which the former belong. Accordingly, the restrictions imposed by svsp are
reasonable for our class of markets.
Next, we consider horizontal syndicates.
hsp A rule in BBM, f, satisfies horizontal syndication-proofness if for every (c, w) ∈ BBM, every
k ∈M \ {m}, and every ∅ 6= S ⊆ Nk,
fm(N1, . . . , Nm, c, w) = fm(S, (N l)l∈M\{k,m}, Nm, γk,S , cM\{k,m}, w), (26)
and ∑
i∈Nk
fki (c, w) ≤
∑
i∈S
fki (γk,S , cM\{k,m}, w), (27)
where cM\{k,m} = (cl)l∈M\{k,m} and γk,S = (cki )i∈S .21
The above property, hsp, requires that the benefits assigned by a rule to each of the buyers should
not be affected by the horizontal syndicate composed of all sellers in Nk when they decide to dump
only those goods into the market that belong to the sellers in S—see Eq. (26). We have also assumed
that the syndicate behaves in a rational way, i.e., the aggregate payoff to all agents in Nk does not
decrease—see Eq. (27). Unlike 2-svp, hsp does not imply that sellers have no incentives to create
a (horizontal) syndicate even when prices are competitive. We refer to the property obtained by
imposing the requirements in hsp only to 2-regular markets as horizontal syndication-proofness for
2-regular markets and we denote it by 2-hsp.
In the following, we show the results concerning the above two properties.
Proposition 7.1. The Talmud Assignment Rule, T, satisfies svsp.
Proposition 7.1 reveals that the Talmud Assignment Rule is vertical syndication-proof for all
markets, but Theorem II specifies that this stronger property is not necessary to characterize the
rule.
Proposition 7.2. Let f be a rule in BBM that satisfies cs, 2-cbs, and 2-abp. Then f does not
satisfy simultaneously 2-vsp and 2-hsp.
Proposition 7.2 identifies certain conditions under which, for the market games considered in this
paper and also for any superclass containing them, a rule does not exist that specifies prices so that
buyers are immune to any arbitrary syndication of the sellers.
21To be consistent with the assumptions made throughout this paper, dummy sellers might be added to sector k so
that there is the same number of agents in all sectors.
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8 Conclusion
This paper has considered syndication in markets. In the literature, various attempts at studying
this phenomenon have been framed within cooperative game theory. Here, we have opted for one
particular cooperative-game solution concept, viz. the nucleolus (see Legros, 1987; Einy et al., 1999).
We believe that it holds out particular promise for an improved understanding of the formation and
behavior of syndicates.
The market games considered herein belong to the class of multi-sided assignment games. The
literature on the latter is relatively scarce, and mainly focuses on finding sufficient conditions to
guarantee the non-emptiness of the core (see Quint, 1991; Stuart Jr, 1997; Sherstyuk, 1999). Our
findings look beyond this concern and yield insights into the functioning of these games.
Multi-sided assignment games with more than two types of agents enable the insightful investiga-
tion of vertical syndicates. We have proposed a definition of vertical syndication-proofness for these
market games. Such a property may be relevant to a regulator who has to decide whether to allow
this form of integration in particular branches of the economy.
Actual markets exist such that (i) their economic structure resembles that of a (Böhm-Bawerk)
multi-sided assignment market and (ii) their vertical production chain has caused some concern.
In this regard, we have discussed the IT industry in the Introduction. Vertical integration in the
steel industry, whose products are largely homogeneous, is also both practiced and the object of
regulators’ attention. The European Union, for example, imposes restrictions on the conduct of the
various parties by means of antitrust laws.22
Lastly, this paper has also established a connection between multi-sided assignment games and
bankruptcy games. Exploiting this connection appears to be a promising direction for future research.
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Appendix
Proposition 8.1. The set of assignment games associated with 2-regular markets, 2 -BBG, and the
set of sectors games, SG, are isomorphic, i.e.,
2 -BBG ∼= SG.
Proof of Proposition 8.1. LetN1, . . . , Nm be fixed throughout the proof, and recall thatM = {1, . . . ,m}
and N = N1 ∪ · · · ∪Nm. First, note that due to Remark 2.2,
SG = {(M, vc,w) : (c, w) ∈ 2 -BBM} ,
and, by Definition 2.3,
2 -BBG = {(N,ωc,w) : (c, w) ∈ 2 -BBM} .
Second, consider the following mapping:
Γ : 2 -BBG → SG
(N,ωc,w) → (M, vc,w)
Note that if (N,ωc,w) = (N,ωc′,w′), then (M,vc,w) = (M,vc′,w′), so Γ is well defined. More-
over, it is straightforward to check that Ψ is surjective. To check that it is also injective, let
(N,ωc,w), (N,ωc′,w′) ∈ 2 -BBG be such that
ωc,w 6= ωc′,w′ . (28)
On the one hand, suppose that r(c, w) = 0. Then, by Eq. (28) it must be that r(c′, w′) = 1.
Thus, vc,w = v0 and vc
′,w′ 6= v0, which implies Γ(N,ωc,w) 6= Γ(N,ωc′,w′).
On the other hand, assume that r(c, w) = r(c′, w′) = 1. From Eq. (28) it follows the existence of
S ⊆ N minimal w.r.t. to inclusion such that ωc,w(S) 6= ωc′,w′(S). Furthermore, from the definition
of the characteristic function of an assignment game, it must be that S = ZR for some R ⊆ M .
Hence,
vc,w(R) = ωc,w(S) 6= ωc′,w′(S) = vc′,w′(R).
Thus, Γ(N,ωc,w) 6= Γ(N,ωc′,w′), so Γ is injective.
Proof of Lemma 5.1. Let f be a rule in BBM satisfying cs, then it trivially satisfies part (ii).
Part (i) then follows from Theorem 2.1. The reverse implication follows from Theorem 2.1 and the
properties of the market (c˜, w˜) defined in Eq. (2). 
Proof of Lemma 5.2. We only prove the first part, as the second part is trivial. Indeed,
|Nk| = |Nm| = 2 since (c, w) ∈ 2 -BBM, and
w2 − αk2(c, w, f)
=w2 − ck2 −
∑
l∈M\{k,m}
(
fl1(c, w) + cl1
)
= w2 − ck2 −
∑
l∈M\{k,m}
cl1 −
∑
l∈M\{k,m}
fl1(c, w)
≤
w2 − ck2 − ∑
l∈M\{k,m}
cl1

+
−
fk2 (c, w) + fm2 (c, w) + ∑
l∈M\{k,m}
fl1(c, w)
 ≤ 0,
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where the penultimate inequality holds because fk2 (c, w) = fm2 (c, w) = 0—due to Theorem 2.1—, the
fact that (c, w) is a 2-regular market, and because f satisfies cs, while the last inequality holds since
(fk(c, w))k∈M is a core allocation of (N, vc,w). 
Proof of Lemma 5.3. By Lemma 5.2, the reduced market is a 2-regular market, so
r(αk(c, w, f), w) ≤ 1. Then it suffices to realize that cs implies fk2 (c, w) = fk2
(
αk(c, w, f), w
)
= 0
and
fk1 (c, w) = ωc,w(N)−
∑
l∈M\{k,m}
fl1(c, w)− fm1 (c, w)
= ωc,w(N)−
∑
l∈M\{k,m}
fl1(c, w)− fm1
(
αk(c, w, f), w
)
= ωc,w(N)−
∑
l∈M\{k,m}
fl1(c, w)− ωα
k(c,w,f),w (Nk ∪Nm)+ fk1 (αk(c, w, f), w)
= fk1
(
αk(c, w, f), w
)
,
where the first and the third equalities hold since f yields efficient allocations for (c, w) and
(αk(c, w, f), w) respectively, the second equality holds since f satisfies 2-vsp, and the last equality
holds since by definition of the reduced market,
ωα
k(c,w,f),w (Nk ∪Nm) = (w1 − αk1(c, w, f))+ =
w1 − ∑
l∈M\{m}
cl1 −
∑
l∈M\{k,m}
fl1(c, w)

+
= ωc,w(N)−
∑
l∈M\{k,m}
fl1(c, w).

Proof of Claim A. Let f be a rule in 2 -BBM satisfying 2-cbs and let (c, w), (c¯, w¯) ∈ 2 -BBM
be two 2-sided markets satisfying w1 − c11 = w¯1 − c¯11 (same total surplus), c12 − c11 = c¯12 − c¯11, and
w1 − w2 = w¯1 − w¯2 (same bargaining power). Then,
w¯2 − c¯11 = (w¯1 − w1 + w2)− c¯11 = (w¯1 − c¯11)− (w1 − c11) + (w2 − c11) = w2 − c11,
w¯1 − c¯12 = w¯1 − (c12 − c11 + c¯11) = (w¯1 − c¯11)− (w1 − c11) + (w1 − c12) = w1 − c12.
Since f satisfies 2-cbs, we obtain f(c, w) = f(c¯, w¯) by inserting the above equations into the two
expressions of Eq. (11). 
Proof of Claim B. Let f be a rule in 2 -BBM satisfying 2-cbs and let (c, w), (c¯, w¯) ∈ 2 -BBM
be two 2-sided markets satisfying w1 − c11 = w¯1 − c¯11 (same total surplus), c12 − c11 = w¯1 − w¯2, and
w1 − w2 = c¯12 − c¯11 (switched bargaining power). Then,
w¯2 − c¯11 = (w¯1 − c12 + c11)− (w¯1 − w1 + c11) = w1 − c12,
w¯1 − c¯12 = (w1 − c11 + c¯11)− (w1 − w2 + c¯11) = w2 − c11.
Since f satisfies 2-cbs, we obtain f1(c¯, w¯) = f2(c, w) and f2(c¯, w¯) = f1(c, w) by inserting the above
equations into the two expressions of Eq. (11). 
Proposition 8.2. The properties that characterize the Talmud Assignment Rule, T, are logically
independent.
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Proof. We consider the following four rules in BBM:
(i) Let the rule in BBM, Tˆ, be defined for every (c, w) ∈ BBM as
Tˆ(c, w) =
T(c, w) if (c, w) ∈ 2 -BBM,0 otherwise.
Then, Tˆ satisfies 2-vsp, 2-abp, and 2-cbs but not cs.
(ii) Let the rule in BBM, Tˆ, assign for every (c, w) ∈ BBM the core-center (see González-Díaz
and Sánchez-Rodríguez (2007)) of (N,ωc,w). From Núñez and Rafels (2005) and Tejada and Núñez
(2012), we know that this allocation differs from the nucleolus (of the assignment game) for the whole
class of market games in BBG, but that they coincide for bilateral markets. Lastly, the core-center is
an anonymous solution concept. Then, Tˆ satisfies cs, 2-abp, and 2-cbs, but not 2-vsp.
(iii) Let CEA be the constrained equal awards bankruptcy rule. This rule is defined for ev-
ery (M,E, d) ∈ BP and i ∈ M by CEAi(M,E, d) = min {di, λ}, where λ is chosen so that∑
i∈M CEAi(E, d) = E. The following properties are known:
(a) CEA chooses a core allocation of the bankruptcy game (M,vE,d)—see Theorem 2 in Thomson
(2003).
(b) CEA satisfies bc—see Theorem 1 in Herrero and Villar (2001).
(c) CEA does not satisfy cg—by Theorem 5.1 and because CEA satisfies wd by construction.
First, let Tˆ = Φ(CEA). From Theorems 2.1 and I and statement (a), it holds that Tˆ satisfies cs.
Second, following the same lines as in the proof of statement (ii) in Proposition 6.2, we can show
that due to statements (a) and (b), Tˆ also satisfies 2-vsp. Third, the definition of Tˆ directly implies
that it satisfies 2-abp. Fourth and last, statement (c), statement (ii) in Proposition 6.1, statement
(i) in Proposition 6.2, and the fact that CEA = Ψ(Φ(CEA)) imply that Tˆ does not satisfy 2-cbs.
(iv) Consider the following subset of 2 -BBM:
V = {((c1, c2), w) ∈ BBM : c11 = c21 = 0, c12 = c22 = c, w1 = w2 < c} .
Since w2− 2c < 0 for all (c, w) ∈ V, we have V ⊆ 2 -BBM. Let the rule in BBM, Tˆ, be such that for
every (c, w) ∈ V,
xk = Tˆk1(N1, N2, N3, c, w) =

w1 if k = 1,
0 if k = 2,
0 if k = 3,
and Tˆk2(c, w) = 0 for all k ∈M = {1, 2, 3}. Note that for every (c, w) ∈ V
vc,w({1}) = (w2 − c)+ = 0, vc,w({1, 2}) = (w2)+ = w2,
vc,w({2}) = (w2 − c)+ = 0, vc,w({1, 3}) = (w1 − c)+ = 0, vc,w({1, 2, 3}) = w1.
vc,w({3}) = (w1 − 2c)+ = 0, vc,w({2, 3}) = (w1 − c)+ = 0,
Hence, sectors 1 and 2 are symmetric players in the sectors game. Since the nucleolus is an anonymous
solution, T11(c, w) = T21(c, w). Also, note that x1 + x2 = w1 ≥ w1, so x ∈ C(M, vc,w), with
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M = {1, 2, 3}. It then follows from part (i) of Theorem 2.1 that Tˆ(c, w) ∈ C(N,ωc,w) for all
(c, w) ∈ V. Next, let the rule in BBM, T˜, be defined for every (c, w) ∈ BBM by
T˜(c, w) =
Tˆ(c, w) if (c, w) ∈ V,T(c, w) otherwise.
By construction, T˜ satisfies 2-cbs and cs. Next we focus on 2-vsp. On the one hand, consider the
reduced market (N1, N3, α1(c, w, T˜), w), where α11(c, w, T˜) = 0 and α12(c, w, T˜) = c. Then,
T˜31(N1, N3, α1(c, w, T˜), w) =
w1 − 0 + (w1 − c)+ − (w2 − 0)+
2 = 0 = T˜
3
1(N1, N2, N3, c, w).
On the other hand, consider the reduced game (N2, N3, α2(c, w, T˜), w), where α21(c, w, T˜) = w1 and
α22(c, w, T˜) = w1 + c. Then,
T˜31(N2, N3, α1(c, w, T˜), w) =
w1 − w1 + (w1 − w1 − c)+ − (w2 − w1)+
2 = 0
= T˜31(N1, N2, N3, c, w).
That is, we have proved that T˜ satisfies 2-vsp. Lastly, since T˜ differs from T, it follows from Theorem
II that T˜ cannot satisfy 2-abp.
Proof of Proposition 7.1. First, we show that T satisfies svsp for 2-regular markets. Indeed,
for such a market, the conditions in the definition of svsp easily follow by repeating the lines in the
proof of Proposition 6.2 and the existence part of Theorem II using consistency instead of bilateral
consistency. Finally, from Lemma 5.1 it follows that T satisfies svsp for arbitrary markets. 
Proof of Proposition 7.2. First, note that if a rule in BBM satisfies 2-cbs, cs, 2-abp,
and 2-vsp, by Theorem II it has to coincide with the Talmud Assignment Rule. Second, consider
the bilateral 2-regular market (c, w) defined by c = c1 = (1, 2) and w = (3, 0), and let k = 1 and
S = {1} ⊆ N1. Then, by Definition 6.1,
T11(c1, w) + T12(c1, w) =
1
2 ≤ 1 = T
1
1(γ1,S , w) + T12(γ1,S , w),
and
T2(c1, w) =
(
3
2 , 0
)
6= (1, 0) = T2(γ1,S , w),
which concludes the proof. 
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